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Abstract
For deriving equilibrium of sticky-price/monopolistic competition New
Keynesian models, first-order conditions are often used. This paper shows
that they may not be sufficient and presents a case out of a simple model
where there exists no equilibrium. This is true even when Taylor rule is
assumed.
1 Modified Rotemberg sticky-price model
In Kim (2016) [3], I discussed how a Rotemberg model [5] leads to accounting
inconsistency problems. But there exists modification [4] of the Rotemberg
model, where the firm pays the inflation costs to the household.
The household has the following optimization problem:
max
Ct,Bt,Nt
U(Ct, Nt) =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
Ct
1−σ
1− σ −
Nt
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
]
(1)
with the modified budget constraint:
PtCt +
Bt
Rt
≤WtNt +Dt +Bt−1 + Ptχ
2
(
Pt
Pt−1
− 1
)2
Ct (2)
where Pt refers to price level, Bt refers to a one-time bond, Ct refers to con-
sumption, Wt refers to nominal wage, Nt is labor, Dt is profit dividends receives
from a continuum of firms.
χ is the degree of price rigidity, and this form allows Ct = Yt in equilibrium,
unlike the standard Rotemberg model.
Notice the additional payment made by the firm to the household. One could
have assumed that this payment is given to the household optimization problem
rather than being dependent on Ct, which means that the household has the
control over this payment. But doing so makes less sense, since the payment
made by the firm is due to some service/household products relating to infla-
tion/deflation.
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I will only derive the optimality condition for labor/consumption, since the IS
equation is not relevant for rest of this paper.
Wt
Pt
= Ct
σNt
ϕ
[
1− χ
2
(
Pt
Pt−1
− 1
)2]
= utCt
σNt
ϕ (3)
One immediately sees one problem with this specification: ut can go negative
for high inflation, which means negative real wage. I will restrict to 0 < ut ≤ 1.
For simplification, I will set P0 = 1.
Let there be a continuum of firms [0, 1]. The production function of each firm
is:
Ct(i) = AtNt(i) (4)
Aggregating over,
Ct = stAtNt (5)
where 0 < st ≤ 1, which is inverse price dispersion factor. In this modified
Rotemberg model, st = 1.
Let the classical equilibrium at time t = 0 be Ce, Ne. Since WeNe = Ce in the
classical equilibrium with We = Ce
σNe
ϕ,
Ce = WeNe = Ce
σNe
ϕ+1 =
Ce
1+σ+ϕ
A0
1+ϕ (6)
Ce = Ae
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ (7)
Let the sticky-price monopolistic-competition equilibrium be C0, N0 at t = 0.
Relating C0 and Ce by C0 = kCe,
D0 = C0 −W0N0 = kCe − u0 k
1+σ+ϕCe
1+σ+ϕ
A0
1+ϕ (8)
W0Ne = u0
kσ+ϕCe
σ+ϕ
A0
ϕ
Ce
A0
= u0
kσ+ϕCe
1+σ+ϕ
A0
1+ϕ (9)
W0Ne +D0 = kCe − u0 k
1+σ+ϕCe
1+σ+ϕ
A0
1+ϕ + u0
kσ+ϕCe
1+σ+ϕ
A0
1+ϕ (10)
The idea is that for the household problem W0 and N0 are given. If the house-
hold wants Ce and Ne as an outcome, would this satisfy the budget constraint?
And if so, would (Ce, Ne) be preferred over (C0, N0)? First, it seems that the
answer to the latter question be no, because the first-order optimality condition
is not satisfied by (Ce, Ne). But what this paper will show is that the condition
is not sufficient. After all, the FOC is only the necessary condition.
kCe − u0 k
1+σ+ϕCe
1+σ+ϕ
A0
1+ϕ + u0
kσ+ϕCe
1+σ+ϕ
A0
1+ϕ ≥ Ce (11)
Ce
1+σ+ϕu0
[
kσ+ϕ − k1+σ+ϕ] ≥ (1− k)A01+ϕCe (12)
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u0k
σ+ϕ [1− k] ≥ 1− k (13)
For k ≥ 1,
u0k
σ+ϕ ≤ 1 (14)
It is easy to find u0 that satisfies Equation 14 given k. For a welfare evaluation
example, suppose A0 = 1. Then, Ce = 1. Let k = 2, which means C0 = 2, with
N0 = 2. Let σ = 0.5, ϕ = 0.5.
Utility provided by (C0, N0) is w(C0, N0) = w(2, 2) = 2
0.5/0.5 − 21.5/1.5 ≈
0.943. w(Ce, Ne) = 1/0.5− 1/1.5 ≈ 1.333. Thus, w(Ce, Ne) > w(C0, N0).
With u = 1/2, Equation 14 is satisfied and 0 < u ≤ 1 is retained, with inflation
of 100% when χ = 1.
What this welfare calibration shows is that this Rotemberg model inevitably
leads to disequilibrium for some sets of inflation and output that were previously
thought as possible equilibria. The household, given Wt, Pt, Dt, B−1, will prefer
(Ce, Ne) over (C0, N0) and thus will not choose (C0, N0). This demonstrates the
fact that FOC is only a necessary one, but does not guarantee that the correct
solution would be achieved.
An additional interpretation of Equation 14 would be that for each k > 1, u0
must be greater than a certain point in order to be considered as a possible
equilibrium - meaning that inflation rate cannot go below or above a certain
level. For k < 1, equation 13 is not satisfied automatically.
1.1 Output asymmetry and monetary policy
The above discussion shows that whenever the output is higher than the classical
level, disequilibrium is the only possible result for non-zero inflation. Even if one
adjusts ut to rule out (Ce, Ne), there always exists a nearby result (C,N) that
is better relative to the original (Ct, Nt). This continues until ut = 1, which
rules out inflation. Getting the cue from the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(NKPC), which can also be derived from the first-order approximation solution
of the Rotemberg model around zero inflation steady state:
pit ≡ Pt
Pt−1
− 1 = βEt [pit+1] + κy˜t (15)
where ct = yt = log(Yt) and y˜t = log(Yt/Yn,t) (output gap) with Yn,t the natural
level obtained without sticky price but with monopolistic competition. κ > 0
is assumed. Thus, down to some positive output gap (because Yn,0 < Ye), pit is
constrained to zero.
βEt [pit+1] = −κy˜t (16)
This suggests that when y˜t is above the classical level, one must expect deflation
at the next period.
To the first order approximation around zero inflation steady state with the
value of χ small enough, one can also recover the standard IS equation:
Et [ct+1] = ct +
1
σ
(it − Et [pit+1]− ρ) (17)
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where ρ = − log β, ct = logCt with it being nominal interest rate. Re-
formulating as the output gap version,
Et [ ˜ct+1] = c˜t +
1
σ
(it − Et [pit+1]− rnt ) (18)
where rnt is the natural rate of interest.
Thus, if yt is greater than the classical level ye, it ≤ rnt − (yt − ye) must be sat-
isfied to retain equilibrium, assuming technology remains constant - otherwise,
inflation expectation would be inconsistent. Thus, any boom would instanta-
neously be curbed - implying output asymmetry. If central bank has control on
it and sets it wrong, then disequilibrium is inevitable.
2 Calvo model
The Calvo sticky-price model [1] presented here has the same household opti-
mization problem as before except that the budget constraint is now
PtCt +
Bt
Rt
≤WtNt +Dt +Bt−1 (19)
Thus real wage first-order condition is given by
Wt
Pt
= Ct
σNt
ϕ (20)
Again assume P0 = 1.
In the Calvo model, production function for an individual firm remains the
same, but now price dispersion affects the final output. Production function
will be changed to:
Yt = stAtNt
1−α (21)
For the Calvo model, 0 < st ≤ 1, and no one value can be pre-determined for
st without specified monetary policy.
Decreasing returns to scale is required for what follows - in constant returns to
scale, the method presented below would fail, as will be seen.
I will assume Pe = 1.
Ce = WeNe =
Ce
σ+ 1+ϕ1−α
A0
1+ϕ
1−α
(22)
Ce = A0
1+ϕ
σ−ασ+ϕ+α (23)
Ne = A0
1+ϕ−σ+ασ−ϕ−α
(σ−ασ+ϕ+α)(1−α) (24)
D0 = A0
1+ϕ
σ−ασ+ϕ+α
[
k − k
σ−ασ+1+ϕ
1−α
s0
1+ϕ
1−α
]
(25)
W0Ne = A0
1+ϕ
σ−ασ+ϕ+α
k
σ−ασ+ϕ
1−α
s0
ϕ
1−α
(26)
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W0Ne +D0 = A0
1+ϕ
σ−ασ+ϕ+α
[
k
σ−ασ+ϕ
1−α
s0
ϕ
1−α
+ k − k
σ−ασ+1+ϕ
1−α
s0
1+ϕ
1−α
]
(27)
It is wished that Ce ≤W0Ne +D0, thus:
1 ≤
[
k
σ−ασ+ϕ
1−α
s0
ϕ
1−α
+ k − k
σ−ασ+1+ϕ
1−α
s0
1+ϕ
1−α
]
(28)
For calibration, suppose that s0 is very close to 1 that s0 = 1 can be assumed.
Then,
1 ≤
[
k
σ−ασ+ϕ
1−α + k − k σ−ασ+1+ϕ1−α
]
(29)
Re-arranging,
1− k ≤ k σ−ασ+ϕ1−α
[
1− k 11−α
]
(30)
Let k < 1.
Again, I will assume that 0 < α < 1 is very close to 1, but not 1, and let 0 < ϕ
be close to 0, but not 0. Similarly let 0 < σ be close to 0 but not 0. Then the
RHS approaches 1 as these parameters become close to the assigned limits, with
ϕ coming close to 0 faster than 1− α.
This demonstrates that there exists some (α, σ, ϕ, k) that satisfies Equation 30,
but it can easily be shown that in case of constant returns to scale (α = 0),
Equation 30 does not hold.
This existence proof demonstrates that some (C0, N0) that is supposed to be
some equilibrium of the Calvo model via first-order conditions, is not actually
an equilibrium, since the household definitely prefers (Ce, Ne) over (C0, N0).
3 Conclusion
This paper suggests that first-order conditions derived from optimization prob-
lems are not sufficient to find a sticky-price monopolistic competition (Rotem-
berg, Calvo) model equilibrium, unless one moves away from standard inter-
pretations. The original Rotemberg model suffers from the accounting problem
exposed in [3], and thus this paper uses the variant for demonstration. Inter-
pretation of New Keynesian Phillips Curve may have to change - inflation is
locked to zero for a range of outputs.
For the Calvo model, while not discussed in this paper, sub-utility function in
terms of CES aggregator may be understood as a final good producer produc-
tion function. Usually, it is assumed that by competitive assumptions zero profit
results in for the final good producer. But this certainly does not have to be
the case (zero profit is assumed, not derived). When the condition is relaxed, a
different understanding can be reached.
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